Epictetus · c. 50 – c. 135 CE
Fragments 52 — Epictetus
Translation by George Long (1877)
Epictetus, Fragments 52
They bring forward (they name, they mention) the peevish philosophers (the Stoics), whose opinion it is that pleasure is not a thing conformable to nature, but is a thing which is consequent on the things which are conformable to nature, as justice, temperance, freedom. What then? is the soul pleased and made tranquil by the pleasures of the body which are smaller, as Epicurus says; and is it not pleased with its own good things, which are the greatest? And indeed nature has given to me modesty, and I blush much when I think of saying anything base (indecent). This motion (feeling) does not permit me to make (consider) pleasure the good and the end (purpose) of life.
Cite this passage
Epictetus, Fragments 52, tr. George Long (1877)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/epictetus-fragments/52
Epictetus, Enchiridion and Fragments, tr. George Long (1877). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesA defence of the Stoic view that pleasure is a by-product of living virtuously, not the goal of life. It questions Epicurus's idea that the soul is calmed by small bodily pleasures, since the soul finds greater satisfaction in its own goods, and natural shame shows that pleasure cannot be life's purpose.
Older wording
- “consequent on”
- — a result of, following from
- “conformable to nature”
- — in line with human nature
Themes and situations
- Pleasure and pain
- Virtue and character
- Nature and the cosmos
- Emotions and the passions
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