Diogenes Laërtius · fl. 3rd century CE
Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.94 — Diogenes Laërtius on the Stoics
Translation by R. D. Hicks (1925)
Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.94
Reported speech · Diogenes Laërtius on the Stoics
Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses—viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue. Another particular definition of good which they give is “the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational.” To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like.
Cite this passage
Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.94 (on the Stoics), tr. R. D. Hicks (1925)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/lives-of-the-stoics/7.94
Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book VII, tr. R. D. Hicks (Loeb, 1925). Text: Perseus Digital Library (CC BY-SA 4.0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesGood is defined as what brings benefit, and virtue, virtuous acts and good people are good in three connected senses. Another definition calls good the natural perfection of a rational being, which also brings joy and gladness along with it. Doctrinal definition.
Older wording
- “partakes”
- — shares in or takes part in
- “qua rational”
- — in so far as it is rational
- “supervening accessories”
- — extras that naturally come along with it
Themes and situations
- Virtue and character
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