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What Would Stoics Do

Cicero (on the Stoics) · 106–43 BCE

Tusculan Disputations 1 ¶116 — Cicero (on the Stoics)

From “On the Contempt of Death”

Translation by C. D. Yonge (1853)

Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 1 ¶116

These arguments may be refuted. For they proceed from his not knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid motion, but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders anger and lust have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul is lodged, for there are many things which depend on the body that give an edge to the soul; many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that all men of great genius are melancholy, so that I should not have been displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many, and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that occasion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of unlikeness. I wish Panaetius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Africanus’s brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father, but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus, that wise and eloquent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the relations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no occasion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that our purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish, there would be, even then, no evil in death?
— Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 1 ¶116 · tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)Read in context →

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Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 1 ¶116, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)

https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/tusculan-disputations/1.116

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences

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In plain English

AI-written notes

Rebuttal of the argument from resemblance: the part of the mind that reasons is separate from the angry and craving parts, bodies shape how sharp the mind is, and children often turn out nothing like excellent parents. The passage then returns to the plan to show that even if the soul perishes, death is no evil.

Older wording

“profligate”
— recklessly immoral

Themes and situations

  • Nature and the cosmos
  • Judgements and impressions

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