Skip to content
What Would Stoics Do

Cicero (on the Stoics) · 106–43 BCE

Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶22 — Cicero (on the Stoics)

From “On Other Perturbations of the Mind”

Translation by C. D. Yonge (1853)

Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶22

But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion and judgment. Therefore they define them more strictly, in order not only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an impending evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already come and present with us. But however I have named the judgments and opinions of perturbations, their meaning is not that merely the perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these perturbations do so: as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandonment of the mind, joy gives rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness (invidentia)—I use that word for instruction’s sake, though it is not so common; because envy (invidia) takes in not only the person who envies, but the person, too, who is envied—emulation, detraction, pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, tribulation, sorrow, lamentation, solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, cowardice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they comprehend malevolence—that is, pleased at another’s misfortune—delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feelings of that kind.
— Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶22 · tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)Read in context →

Cite this passage

Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶22, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)

https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/tusculan-disputations/4.22

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences

Read Book IV in context →

In plain English

AI-written notes

All emotional disturbances are held to rest on judgments, which makes them blameworthy but also within our power: grief is a fresh belief that something bad is happening, joy a fresh belief that something good is, fear a belief that coming evil will be unbearable, and craving a belief that a future good would be a benefit. Each has many subtypes, such as envy, pity, shame and anger, and all depend on agreeing to an impression without good grounds.

Older wording

“assenting”
— agreeing to or accepting an impression as true
“solicitude”
— anxious concern
“emulation”
— rivalry, jealous competition

Themes and situations

  • Judgements and impressions
  • Emotions and the passions
  • What is in our control
  • Fear and anxiety
  • Grief and mourning

Quote cards

The opening line of this passage as an image, with its citation — for sharing or keeping.