Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶29 — Cicero (on the Stoics)

Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 4 ¶29

Even as there may be, with respect to the body, a disease, a sickness, and a defect, so it is with the mind. They call that a disease where the whole body is corrupted; they call that sickness where a disease is attended with a weakness; and that a defect where the parts of the body are not well compacted together, from whence it follows that the members are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that these two, a disease and sickness, proceed from a violent concussion and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. But a disease of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sickness. But a viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life. Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions; in the other case, the consequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. For every vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts, as is the case with those who are not far from being wise men: with them there is that affection which is inconsistent with itself while it is foolish, but it is not distorted nor depraved. But diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness. But it is a question whether perturbations are parts of the same, for vices are permanent affections; perturbations are such as are restless, so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is there in good, for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness, quickness of motion; the same may be said of the mind. The body is said to be in a good state when all those things on which health depends are consistent. The same may be said of the mind when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another. And this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to the precepts of temperance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it to be any distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it is to be found only in a wise man. But there is a certain soundness of mind which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed by the care and management of his physicians. And as what is called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue or containing within itself the very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called swiftness, a praise which we ascribe to the mind from its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time.