Cicero (on the Stoics) · 106–43 BCE
Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶70 — Cicero (on the Stoics)
From “Whether Virtue Alone Be Sufficient for a Happy Life”
Translation by C. D. Yonge (1853)
Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶70
When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man who had served the office of praetor, not only gave his opinion in the Senate, and was ready to assist his friends, but wrote a Greek history, and had a considerable acquaintance with literature. Diodorus the Stoic was blind, and lived many years at my house. He, indeed, which is scarcely credible, besides applying himself more than usual to philosophy, and playing on the flute, agreeably to the custom of the Pythagoreans, and having books read to him night and day, in all which he did not want eyes, contrived to teach geometry, which, one would think, could hardly be done without the assistance of eyes, telling his scholars how and where to draw every line. They relate of Asclepiades, a native of Eretria, and no obscure philosopher, when someone asked him what inconvenience he suffered from his blindness, that his reply was, “He was at the expense of another servant.” So that, as the most extreme poverty may be borne if you please, as is daily the case with some in Greece, so blindness may easily be borne, provided you have the support of good health in other respects. Democritus was so blind he could not distinguish white from black; but he knew the difference between good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and base, the useful and useless, great and small. Thus one may live happily without distinguishing colors; but without acquainting yourself with things, you cannot. And this man was of opinion that the intense application of the mind was taken off by the objects that presented themselves to the eye; and while others often could not see what was before their feet, he travelled through all infinity. It is reported also that Homer was blind, but we observe his painting as well as his poetry. What country, what coast, what part of Greece, what military attacks, what dispositions of battle, what array, what ship, what motions of men and animals, can be mentioned which he has not described in such a manner as to enable us to see what he could not see himself? What, then! can we imagine that Homer, or any other learned man, has ever been in want of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and patrimonies and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, for that Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram.
Cite this passage
Cicero (on the Stoics), Tusculan Disputations 5 ¶70, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853)
https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/tusculan-disputations/5.70
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, tr. C. D. Yonge (1853). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences
In plain English
AI-written notesBlindness has not stopped people from governing, writing history, teaching geometry or composing great poetry, and a mind trained on real knowledge loses little without the eyes. Some thinkers even argue that sight is a distraction from deep thought. The ability to tell good from bad, just from unjust and useful from useless matters far more than telling colours apart.
Older wording
- “praetor”
- — a senior Roman judge-magistrate
- “Cyclops”
- — the one-eyed giant of Greek myth
- “Augur”
- — a Roman priest who read omens
Themes and situations
- Illness and the body
- Resilience and endurance
- Adversity and hardship
- Learning and progress
- Acceptance and fate
- Illness or diagnosis
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