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What Would Stoics Do

Epictetus · c. 50 – c. 135 CE

Discourses 2.22 ¶5 — Epictetus

From “On Friendship”

Translation by George Long (1877)

Epictetus, Discourses 2.22 ¶5

It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both; and the Romans with the Getae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed anyone who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted; it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine, not what other men examine—if they are born of the same parents and brought up together, and under the same pedagogue—but examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free: do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest things and of nothing else?
— Epictetus, Discourses 2.22 ¶5 · tr. George Long (1877)Read in context →

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Epictetus, Discourses 2.22 ¶5, tr. George Long (1877)

https://whatwouldstoicsdo.com/passage/discourses/2.22.5

Epictetus, Discourses (as recorded by Arrian), tr. George Long (1877). Text: Standard Ebooks (CC0). Sources and licences

Read Book II, Chapter 22 in context →

In plain English

AI-written notes

Do not judge a friendship by shared history, blood ties or oaths, because wars between old friends and brothers show that people whose interests lie in outside things will turn on each other. Look at what they put first: only those who place the good in their own choices and character can be trusted as friends.

Older wording

“pedagogue”
— a household attendant who escorted a child to school
“ruling principle”
— the governing part of the mind
“externals”
— things outside your control, such as money and reputation

Themes and situations

  • Friendship
  • Judgements and impressions
  • Virtue and character
  • What is in our control
  • Community and our duty to others
  • Trouble with a friend
  • Betrayal
  • Family conflict

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